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  ___________________________	  	  	  	  	   WHILE	  civil	  libertarians	  embrace	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  bill	  of	  rights	  as	  a	  hallmark	  in	  human	  right	  protection,	  the	  skeptics	  have	  labeled	  a	  bill	  of	  right	  as	  a	  “bill	  of	  wrongs”	  or	  even	  a	  “criminal	  charter”.	  	  Such	  skeptical	  sentiment	  is	  understandable,	  as	  in	  many	  jurisdictions	  those	  who	  face	  criminal	  charges	  are	  usually	  among	  the	  first	  group	  to	  invoke	  human	  rights	  protection,	  and	  not	  surprisingly,	  some	  people	  consider	  that	  constitutional	  protection	  may	  have	  gone	  too	  far	  in	  protecting	  the	  dubious	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  	  This	  tension	  between	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  interest	  is	  best	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence,	  which	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  	  	  This	  presumption	  shapes	  our	  approach	  towards	  burden	  of	  proof,	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination,	  and	  the	  remedies	  towards	  a	  violation	  of	  this	  fundamental	  presumption.	  	  Yet	  ironically,	  this	  golden	  thread	  of	  our	  criminal	  justice	  system	  has	  only	  a	  recent	  origin,	  and	  is	  entirely	  judge-­‐made,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  is	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  Parliamentary	  acceptance.	  	  In	  a	  traditional	  common	  law	  system	  without	  a	  bill	  of	  rights,	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  is	  hamstringed	  by	  Parliament	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  reversed	  onus	  provisions	  and	  statutory	  abrogation	  of	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination.	  	  When	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  acquires	  a	  constitutional	  status	  in	  a	  bill	  of	  rights,	  the	  power	  is	  re-­‐balanced	  as	  it	  is	  now	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  judiciary	  to	  determine	  whether	  statutory	  encroachment	  into	  this	  judge-­‐made	  presumption	  has	  gone	  too	  far.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  how	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  judiciary	  responds	  to	  this	  new	  challenge	  by	  focusing	  on	  two	  main	  issues:	  reversed	  onus	  provisions	  and	  statutory	  inroads	  into	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  whether	  a	  bill	  of	  right	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  criminal	  charter	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  set	  of	  rhetorical	  promises	  depends	  largely	  on	  how	  the	  judiciary	  is	  going	  to	  interpret	  the	  constitutional	  provisions,	  and	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  judiciary	  is	  from	  time	  to	  time	  shaped	  by	  prevailing	  social,	  political	  and	  legal	  environment,	  and	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  the	  unique	  constitutional	  framework	  of	  “one	  country,	  two	  systems”	  when	  the	  sovereign	  country	  has	  a	  different	  criminal	  justice	  system	  and	  does	  not	  accept	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	  	  	  The	  challenge	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  judiciary	  is	  best	  captured	  by	  Justice	  Kennedy	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  his	  
2	  	  
inspiring	  speech	  to	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  judiciary	  shortly	  after	  the	  change	  of	  sovereignty	  over	  Hong	  Kong:1	  	   “It	  is	  our	  human	  condition,	  it	  is	  our	  common	  fate	  that	  we	  may	  never	  know	  the	  verdict	  that	  history	  returns	  on	  our	  efforts,	  our	  attempts	  to	  shape	  our	  own	  times.	  	  We	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  you	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  are	  writing	  a	  quiet	  epilogue,	  or	  are	  instead	  writing	  a	  prologue	  for	  what	  will	  become	  a	  new	  and	  noble	  chapter	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  law.	  	  I	  hope	  and	  pray	  it	  is	  the	  latter.”	  	  	  	   It	  is	  against	  such	  background	  that	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  development	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  under	  the	  constitutional	  system	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  	  	  
The	  Constitutional	  Framework	  	  	   Hong	  Kong	  became	  a	  British	  colony	  in	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century.	  	  	  Despite	  all	  the	  shortcomings	  associated	  with	  colonialism,	  the	  British	  Government	  has	  brought	  to	  Hong	  Kong	  the	  common	  law	  system,	  a	  benign	  government	  that	  ruled	  on	  consensus,	  and	  an	  efficient	  and	  a	  relatively	  liberal	  regime.	  	  Within	  a	  century	  Hong	  Kong	  has	  been	  transformed	  from	  a	  remote	  fishing	  village	  into	  a	  major	  international	  financial	  centre.	  	  By	  virtue	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐British	  Joint	  Declaration	  1984,	  the	  British	  Government	  agreed	  to	  return	  Hong	  Kong	  to	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  in	  1997,	  and	  in	  return,	  China	  agreed	  to	  make	  Hong	  Kong	  a	  Special	  Administrative	  Region	  governed	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  “one	  country,	  two	  systems”	  model.	  	  In	  essence,	  Hong	  Kong	  will	  retain	  its	  legal,	  social	  and	  economic	  system.	  	  The	  common	  law	  is	  preserved.	  	  The	  previous	  judicial	  system	  is	  retained,	  save	  that	  a	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  is	  established	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  Independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  fundamental	  human	  rights,	  and	  prosecutorial	  independence	  are	  guaranteed.	  	  Chinese	  socialist	  policies	  or	  criminal	  law	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  These	  guarantees	  are	  written	  into	  the	  Basic	  Law,	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Special	  Administrative	  Region,	  which	  was	  promulgated	  by	  the	  National	  People’s	  Congress	  in	  April	  1990.	  	  	   In	  1991,	  despite	  China’s	  objection,	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Legislative	  Council	  enacted	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  Ordinance,	  which	  incorporated	  into	  domestic	  law	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (“ICCPR”)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	   Speech	  delivered	  to	  the	  Judiciary	  on	  5	  February	  1999;	  quote	  in	  Kemal	  Bokhary,	  Recollections	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  2013),	  pp	  213-­‐214.	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as	  applied	  to	  Hong	  Kong.	  2	  	  On	  1	  July	  1997,	  the	  Basic	  Law	  came	  into	  effect.	  	  Chapter	  3	  of	  the	  Basic	  Law	  sets	  out	  the	  protection	  for	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  Article	  39	  provides	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  as	  applied	  to	  Hong	  Kong	  shall	  remain	  in	  force	  and	  shall	  be	  implemented	  through	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  HKSAR.	  	  The	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  enjoyed	  by	  Hong	  Kong	  residents	  shall	  not	  be	  restricted	  unless	  as	  prescribed	  by	  law,	  and	  such	  restrictions	  shall	  not	  contravene	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  as	  applied	  to	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  Soon	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  HKSAR,	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  has	  confirmed	  the	  constitutional	  status	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  as	  applied	  to	  Hong	  Kong,	  and	  the	  supreme	  authority	  of	  the	  Basic	  Law	  such	  that	  any	  law	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  Basic	  Law	  shall	  be	  of	  no	  legal	  effect.3	  	  In	  short,	  the	  courts	  assume	  without	  question	  the	  power	  of	  constitutional	  review.	  	  
	  
Reversed	  Onus	  Provisions	  	  	   The	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  has	  rightly	  been	  described	  as	  “the	  golden	  thread	  of	  criminal	  law”.4	  	  It	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  which	  will	  become	  a	  very	  different	  system	  without	  such	  presumption.	  	  Among	  other	  things,	  the	  presumption	  means	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  an	  offence	  falls	  on	  the	  prosecution.	  	  However,	  over	  the	  years,	  it	  has	  been	  found	  convenient	  to	  place	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  some	  elements	  of	  an	  offence	  to	  the	  defendant,	  invariably	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  for	  the	  prosecution	  to	  prove	  these	  elements	  or	  that	  the	  facts	  are	  peculiarly	  within	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  defendant.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  first	  case	  that	  reached	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  on	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  was	  a	  case	  challenging	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  a	  number	  of	  reversed	  onus	  provisions	  in	  the	  Dangerous	  Drug	  Ordinance.	  	  In	  a	  colourful	  judgment,	  Silke	  VP	  held	  that:5	  	  	   “In	  my	  judgment,	  the	  glass	  through	  which	  we	  view	  the	  interpretation	  of	  	   the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bill	  is	  a	  glass	  provided	  by	  the	  Covenant.	  	  We	  are	  no	  longer	  	   guided	  by	  the	  ordinary	  cannons	  of	  construction	  of	  statues	  nor	  with	  the	  	   dicta	  of	  the	  common	  law	  inherent	  in	  our	  training.	  	  We	  must	  look,	  in	  our	  	   interpretation	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bill,	  at	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Covenant	  and	  give	  	   ‘full	  recognition	  and	  effect’	  to	  the	  statement	  which	  commences	  that	  	   Covenant.	  	  From	  this	  stems	  the	  entirely	  new	  jurisprudential	  approach	  to	  	   which	  I	  have	  already	  referred.	  “	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  J	  Chan	  &	  C	  L	  Lim	  (eds),	  The	  Law	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  Constitution	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  2011),	  chs	  1	  and	  15.	  3	  Ng	  Ka	  Ling	  v	  HKSAR	  (1999)	  2	  HKCFAR	  4;	  A	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  ICAC	  (2012)	  15	  HKCFAR	  360	  at	  381,	  paras	  34-­‐36.	  4	  Woolmington	  v	  DPP	  [1935]	  AC	  462	  at	  481-­‐482,	  per	  Lord	  Sankey	  LC.	  	  5	  R	  v	  Sin	  Yau	  Ming	  (1991)	  1	  HKPLR	  88,	  107.	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   Under	  this	  new	  jurisprudential	  approach,	  in	  balancing	  individual	  rights	  against	  societal	  interests,	  the	  courts	  proceed	  with	  a	  presumption	  in	  favour	  of	  individual	  rights,	  and	  the	  Government	  has	  to	  tilt	  the	  balance	  by	  presenting	  cogent	  and	  persuasive	  evidence.	  	  Silke	  VP	  laid	  down	  the	  following	  guidelines:6	  	  	   “The	  onus	  is	  on	  the	  Crown	  to	  justify.	  	  It	  is	  to	  be	  discharged	  on	  the	  	   preponderance	  of	  probability.	  	  The	  evidence	  of	  the	  Crown	  needs	  to	  be	  	   cogent	  and	  persuasive.	  	  The	  interests	  of	  the	  individual	  must	  be	  balanced	  	   against	  the	  interests	  of	  society	  generally	  but,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  	   the	  Covenant	  and	  its	  aim	  and	  objects,	  with	  a	  bias	  towards	  the	  interests	  of	  	   the	  individual.”	  	  	   After	  reviewing	  comparative	  jurisprudence	  from	  international	  and	  foreign	  domestic	  jurisdictions	  with	  a	  constitutional	  bill	  of	  rights,	  the	  court	  concluded	  that	  a	  mandatory	  presumption	  of	  fact	  may	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  constitutional	  guarantee	  of	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  only	  if	  the	  Crown	  could	  show,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  legislative	  intention,	  that	  “the	  fact	  to	  be	  presumed	  rationally	  and	  realistically	  follows	  from	  that	  proved	  and	  also	  if	  the	  presumption	  is	  no	  more	  than	  proportionate	  to	  what	  is	  warranted	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  evil	  against	  which	  society	  requires	  protection.”7	  	  Under	  the	  then	  legislation,	  a	  defendant	  was	  presumed	  to	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  dangerous	  drug	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  trafficking	  if	  he	  was	  found	  to	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  a	  certain	  quantity	  of	  dangerous	  drug	  (O.5	  gram	  or	  more	  than	  5	  packets	  whatever	  be	  the	  quantity	  of	  the	  drug).	  	  He	  was	  further	  presumed	  to	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  dangerous	  drug	  and	  to	  know	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  drug	  if	  he	  was	  found	  to	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  a	  key	  to	  anything	  where	  the	  drug	  was	  found,	  which	  involved	  building	  a	  presumption	  upon	  another	  presumption.	  	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  these	  reversed	  onus	  provisions	  were	  too	  broad	  and,	  on	  the	  evidence	  before	  it,	  failed	  to	  satisfy	  the	  rationality	  test	  and	  were	  hence	  unconstitutional.	  	  	  	   Encouraged	  by	  this	  judgment,	  the	  courts	  were	  soon	  flooded	  with	  constitutional	  challenges	  against	  many	  reversed	  onus	  provisions.	  	  	  As	  these	  provisions	  could	  take	  many	  different	  forms,	  the	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  it	  should	  consider	  the	  substance	  rather	  than	  the	  form	  in	  approaching	  reverse	  onus	  provisions.	  	  Some	  provisions	  may	  appear	  as	  classic	  reverse	  onus	  provisions;	  some	  may	  impose	  an	  evidential	  rather	  than	  a	  legal	  burden	  on	  the	  defendant.	  	  Sometimes	  it	  could	  be	  a	  presumption	  of	  law	  rather	  than	  a	  presumption	  of	  fact.	  	  Sometimes	  the	  essential	  element	  of	  an	  offence	  may	  be	  drafted	  as	  a	  defence.8	  	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid,	  113.	  7	  Ibid,	  134.	  8	  See	  Brown	  v	  Stott	  [2003]	  1	  AC	  681	  at	  710B-­‐D	  where	  Lord	  Steyn	  addressed	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  redrafting	  a	  provision	  requiring	  the	  registered	  owner	  to	  supply	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presumption	  of	  innocence	  was	  also	  held	  to	  apply	  to	  both	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  and	  the	  post-­‐trial	  stage.	  	  It	  has	  been	  invoked	  to	  challenge	  interdiction	  and	  suspension	  of	  part	  of	  the	  salary	  of	  a	  civil	  servant	  who	  has	  faced	  criminal	  charges,9	  extensive	  pre-­‐trial	  adverse	  publicity,10	  refusal	  to	  award	  cost	  upon	  successful	  appeal	  against	  conviction	  with	  an	  order	  for	  a	  re-­‐trial,11	  and	  a	  presumption,	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  sentencing,	  of	  having	  committed	  repeated	  offences	  of	  managing	  an	  unlicensed	  massage	  establishment	  if	  another	  person	  has	  previously	  been	  convicted	  of	  the	  same	  offence	  at	  the	  same	  address.12	  	  	  	  	   Judicial	  enthusiasm	  on	  constitutional	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  was	  halted	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  in	  Attorney	  General	  v	  Lee	  Kwong-­‐kut.13	  	  Lord	  Woolf	  set	  down	  a	  more	  cautious	  approach	  to	  constitutional	  interpretation:	  	  	   “While	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  judiciary	  should	  be	  zealous	  in	  upholding	  an	  	   individual’s	  rights	  under	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bill,	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  	   that	  disputes	  as	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Bill	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  get	  out	  of	  hand.	  	  	   The	  issues	  involving	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bill	  should	  be	  approached	  with	  	   realism	  and	  good	  sense,	  and	  kept	  in	  proportion.	  	  If	  this	  is	  not	  done,	  the	  Bill	  	   will	  become	  a	  source	  of	  injustice	  rather	  than	  justice	  and	  it	  will	  be	  debased	  	   in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  public.	  	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  	   individual	  and	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  rigid	  and	  inflexible	  standards	  	   should	  not	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  Legislature’s	  attempts	  to	  resolve	  the	  	   difficult	  and	  intransigent	  problems	  with	  which	  society	  is	  faced	  when	  	   seeking	  to	  deal	  with	  serious	  crime.	  	  It	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  questions	  	   of	  policy	  remain	  primarily	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Legislature.”	  	  That	  case	  involved	  two	  appeals	  that	  were	  heard	  together.	  	  In	  the	  first	  appeal,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  challenge	  was	  section	  30	  of	  the	  Summary	  Offences	  Ordinance,	  under	  which	  a	  person	  committed	  an	  offence	  if	  he	  was	  found	  to	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  anything	  that	  was	  reasonably	  suspected	  of	  being	  stolen	  or	  unlawfully	  obtained,	  unless	  he	  could	  provide	  a	  satisfactory	  account	  of	  how	  he	  came	  by	  the	  same.	  	  The	  second	  appeal	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  section	  25	  of	  the	  Drug	  Trafficking	  (Recovery	  of	  Proceeds)	  Ordinance,	  which	  provided	  for	  an	  offence	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  any	  arrangement	  to	  facilitate	  the	  retention	  or	  control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  driver	  at	  the	  material	  time	  for	  a	  suspected	  traffic	  offence	  into	  a	  presumption	  of	  the	  registered	  owner	  being	  the	  driver	  until	  the	  contrary	  is	  proved.	  9	  Yeung	  Chung	  Ming	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Police	  (2008)	  11	  HKCFAR	  513.	  10	  R	  v	  Lo	  Chak	  Man(No	  2)	  (1994)	  4	  HKPLR	  466.	  11	  R	  v	  Man	  Wai	  Keung	  (No	  2)	  [1992]	  2	  HKCLR	  207.	  12	  R	  v	  Wong	  Yan-­‐fuk	  (1993)	  3	  HKPLR	  341;	  see	  also	  R	  v	  Ko	  Chi-­‐yuen	  [1994]	  2	  HKCLR	  65	  (assumptions	  of	  benefits	  in	  confiscation	  proceedings)	  13	  [1993]	  2	  HKLRD	  186	  at	  202.	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of	  the	  proceeds	  of	  drug	  trafficking,	  with	  a	  defence	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  knowledge	  or	  reasonable	  suspicion	  that	  the	  relevant	  arrangement	  was	  related	  to	  the	  proceeds	  of	  drug	  trafficking.	  	  	  The	  Privy	  Council	  rejected	  the	  rationality	  and	  proportionality	  tests,	  describing	  them	  as	  an	  unnecessarily	  complex	  process.	  	  	  Instead,	  it	  proposed	  a	  reasonableness	  test:14	  	   “Some	  exceptions	  will	  be	  justifiable,	  others	  will	  not.	  	  Whether	  they	  are	  justifiable	  will	  in	  the	  end	  depend	  upon	  whether	  it	  remains	  primarily	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  prosecution	  to	  prove	  the	  guilt	  of	  an	  accused	  to	  the	  required	  standard	  and	  whether	  the	  exception	  is	  reasonably	  imposed,	  notwithstanding	  the	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  the	  principle	  which	  article	  11(1)	  enshrines.	  	  The	  less	  significant	  the	  departure	  from	  the	  normal	  principle,	  the	  simpler	  it	  will	  be	  to	  justify	  an	  exception.	  	  If	  the	  prosecution	  retains	  responsibility	  for	  proving	  the	  essential	  ingredients	  of	  the	  offence,	  the	  less	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  an	  exception	  will	  be	  regarded	  as	  unacceptable.	  	  In	  deciding	  what	  are	  the	  essential	  ingredients,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  relevant	  statutory	  provision	  will	  be	  important.	  	  However	  what	  will	  be	  decisive	  will	  be	  the	  substance	  and	  reality	  of	  the	  language	  creating	  the	  offence	  rather	  than	  its	  form.”	  	  	   Applying	  these	  tests,	  the	  Privy	  Council	  found	  the	  shifting	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  the	  defendant	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  innocent	  possession,	  which	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  element	  of	  the	  summary	  offence	  of	  unlawful	  possession,	  violated	  the	  right	  to	  be	  presumed	  innocent,	  whereas	  the	  defence	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  knowledge	  or	  reasonable	  suspicion	  in	  the	  Drug	  Trafficking	  (Recovery	  of	  Proceeds)	  Ordinance,	  which	  was	  something	  the	  defendant	  could	  easily	  substantiate	  but	  extremely	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  for	  the	  prosecution	  to	  prove,	  was	  justifiable.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  two	  reversed	  onus	  provisions	  were	  said	  to	  be	  “examples	  of	  situations	  close	  to	  the	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum	  of	  what	  does	  and	  does	  not	  contravene	  article	  11(1).”15	  	  	  	   Lord	  Woolf	  further	  added	  that	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases,	  the	  court	  would	  be	  able	  to	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  whether	  the	  reverse	  onus	  provisions	  were	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  by	  examining	  the	  provisions	  themselves,	  without	  the	  need	  to	  go	  through	  the	  complex	  tests	  of	  rationality	  and	  proportionality.	  	  Even	  when	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  resort	  to	  these	  tests	  in	  the	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  these	  tests	  should	  be	  applied	  with	  caution	  and	  flexibility.16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  At	  198.	  15	  Ibid,	  at	  200.	  16	  Ibid,	  at	  200.	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   It	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  understand	  the	  judicial	  skepticism	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  towards	  the	  tests	  of	  rationality	  and	  proportionality.	  	  The	  Privy	  Council	  is	  probably	  right	  that,	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases,	  the	  outcome	  would	  be	  the	  same	  whichever	  approach	  is	  adopted.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  lends	  itself	  to	  a	  subjective	  assessment	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  reverse	  onus	  provisions.	  	  	  By	  treating	  the	  matter	  as	  purely	  one	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  the	  Privy	  Council’s	  approach	  may	  not	  allow	  the	  court	  to	  consider	  the	  evidence	  on	  the	  practical	  operation	  of	  a	  reverse	  onus	  provision	  or	  the	  alternative	  measures,	  which	  is	  what	  proportionality	  would	  require.	  	  Take	  the	  Sin	  Yau	  Ming	  case	  as	  an	  example.	  	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  assess	  whether	  it	  is	  constitutional	  to	  require	  a	  defendant	  to	  rebut	  a	  presumption	  of	  possession	  of	  dangerous	  drug	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  trafficking	  when	  he	  is	  in	  possession	  of	  0.5	  gm	  or	  more	  of	  dangerous	  drug,	  without	  considering	  evidence	  on	  the	  average	  consumption	  of	  dangerous	  drug	  by	  an	  average	  drug	  addict,	  or	  the	  pattern	  of	  acquisition	  of	  dangerous	  drug.17	  	  Likewise,	  in	  considering	  the	  proportionality	  of	  a	  presumption	  of	  repeated	  offences,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  conviction	  of	  operating	  an	  unlawful	  gambling	  establishment	  or	  an	  unlicenced	  massage	  parlour,	  by	  reason	  of	  a	  similar	  previous	  conviction	  of	  another	  person	  at	  the	  same	  address,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  confine	  oneself	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  statutory	  provision	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  evidence,	  and	  sometimes	  the	  alternative	  measures	  available	  to	  the	  prosecution.	  	  	  The	  intuitive	  approach	  is	  particularly	  dangerous	  when	  a	  popular	  but	  draconian	  provision	  is	  involved,	  such	  as	  a	  presumption	  that	  a	  civil	  servant	  is	  corrupted	  if	  he	  maintains	  a	  standard	  of	  living	  that	  is	  incommensurate	  with	  his	  official	  emolument.	  	  There	  is	  of	  course	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  a	  judge	  who	  has	  adopted	  the	  approach	  advocated	  by	  the	  Privy	  Council	  from	  asking	  for	  evidence	  of	  justification,	  but	  this	  will	  largely	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  individual	  judges,	  whereas	  the	  Sin	  Yau	  Ming	  approach	  allows	  all	  parties	  concerned	  to	  know	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  where	  they	  stand,	  what	  they	  have	  to	  prove	  and	  what	  evidence	  would	  be	  necessary.	  	  It	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  mechanical	  approach	  should	  be	  adopted	  or	  that	  the	  rationality	  and	  proportionality	  tests	  will	  always	  produce	  the	  right	  answer,	  but	  a	  systematic	  approach	  is	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  more	  convincing	  and	  objective	  solution	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  objectively	  and	  rationally	  tested.	  	  More	  importantly,	  a	  statutory	  interpretation	  approach	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  the	  triumph	  of	  societal	  interests	  over	  individual	  rights,	  whereas	  the	  rationality	  and	  proportionality	  tests	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  rigorous	  scrutiny	  of	  any	  restriction	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  evidence	  adduced	  by	  the	  prosecution	  showed	  that	  the	  average	  drug	  consumption	  of	  an	  average	  drug	  addict	  is	  about	  0.9	  gm	  per	  day,	  thus	  casting	  doubt	  on	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  adopting	  0.5	  gm	  as	  a	  criterion	  to	  trigger	  the	  presumption.	  	  It	  was	  further	  shown	  that	  most	  drug	  addicts	  tend	  to	  acquire	  sufficient	  drug	  for	  a	  few	  days’	  consumption,	  and	  hence	  the	  amount	  would	  easily	  be	  above	  the	  statutory	  triggering	  point	  even	  though	  the	  drug	  was	  acquired	  for	  personal	  consumption.	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   Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  has	  no	  hesitation	  in	  preferring	  the	  Sin	  Yau	  Ming’s	  approach	  when	  this	  issue	  was	  raised	  under	  the	  Basic	  Law	  after	  the	  change	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  	  In	  Lam	  Kwong	  Wai,	  the	  defendant	  challenged	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  section	  20(3)	  of	  the	  Firearms	  and	  Ammunition	  Ordinance,	  which	  created	  an	  offence	  of	  possession	  of	  an	  imitation	  firearm	  for	  a	  purpose	  dangerous	  to	  the	  public	  peace	  or	  for	  the	  commission	  of	  an	  offence.	  .18	  	  	  It	  then	  provided	  for	  a	  defence	  if	  a	  defendant	  could	  satisfy	  the	  court	  that	  he	  was	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  firearm	  for	  an	  innocent	  purpose.	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  readily	  accepted	  that,	  to	  pass	  muster	  the	  Basic	  Law,	  the	  relevant	  presumption	  could	  only	  be	  justified	  if	  it	  had	  a	  rational	  connection	  with	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  and	  if	  it	  was	  no	  more	  than	  necessary	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  that	  legitimate	  aim,	  and	  the	  justification	  had	  to	  be	  compelling.19	  	  Although	  the	  reverse	  onus	  provision	  was	  formulated	  as	  a	  defence,	  it	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  placing	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  the	  offence	  on	  the	  defendant,	  and	  hence	  it	  had	  to	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  rationality	  and	  proportionality	  tests.20	  	  While	  it	  satisfied	  the	  rationality	  test,	  it	  failed	  the	  proportionality	  test	  by	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  defendant.	  	  In	  upholding	  the	  reverse	  onus	  provision,	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  was	  prepared	  to	  adopt	  a	  remedial	  interpretation	  by	  reading	  down	  the	  provision	  to	  impose	  an	  evidential,	  rather	  than	  legal,	  burden	  of	  proof.	  	  It	  reached	  this	  conclusion	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Legislature	  has	  considered	  appropriate	  to	  impose	  a	  persuasive	  burden,	  holding	  that	  in	  the	  area	  of	  matters	  of	  proof,	  onus	  and	  evidence,	  the	  Court	  was	  the	  master	  of	  its	  own	  house	  and	  was	  able	  to	  form	  its	  own	  judgment	  after	  giving	  appropriate	  respect	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Legislature.21	  	  	   This	  case	  raises	  the	  vexed	  question	  whether	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  an	  offence	  on	  the	  defendant	  could	  ever	  be	  justified.	  	  	  The	  argument	  against	  such	  a	  provision	  is	  that	  a	  defendant	  would	  be	  exposed	  to	  a	  risk	  of	  conviction	  notwithstanding	  that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  raise	  a	  reasonable	  doubt	  in	  the	  prosecution	  case,	  but	  is	  unable	  to	  discharge	  his	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof.	  	  This	  is	  a	  powerful	  argument,	  which	  has	  by	  and	  large	  been	  accepted	  by	  the	  court,22	  but	  the	  court	  was	  nonetheless	  reluctant	  to	  lay	  down	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  (2006)	  9	  HKCFAR	  574,	  593,	  para	  21	  and	  595,	  para	  29,	  per	  Sir	  Anthony	  Mason	  NPJ.	  19	  Paras	  42-­‐	  43.	  	  See	  also	  R	  v	  Johnstone	  [2003]	  1	  WLR	  1736	  at	  1749H-­‐1750A,	  per	  Lord	  Nicholls;	  S	  v	  Mbatha	  (1996)	  (3)	  BCLR	  293	  (SACC).	  	  20	  See	  paras	  32-­‐34.	  	  It	  is	  a	  fine	  line	  between	  imposing	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  an	  essential	  element	  on	  the	  defendant	  and	  completing	  the	  criminal	  offence	  without	  that	  essential	  element,	  which	  is	  left	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  defence.	  	  See	  also	  Sweet	  v	  
Parsley	  [1970]	  AC	  132	  at	  150C	  (per	  Lord	  Reid).	  21	  Para	  45.	  22	  Paras	  23-­‐28	  &	  41.	  	  See	  also	  R	  v	  Lambert	  [2002]	  2	  AC	  545	  at	  572D	  (per	  Lord	  Steyn);	  R	  v	  Whyte	  (1985)	  51	  DLR	  (4th)	  481	  at	  493	  (per	  Dickson	  CJC).	  	  See	  also	  the	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general	  principle	  that	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  to	  disprove	  an	  element	  of	  an	  offence	  is	  always	  unconstitutional.	  	  Instead,	  it	  suggested,	  without	  elaboration,	  that	  there	  might	  be	  situations	  where	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  on	  a	  defendant	  could	  be	  justified.	  It	  distinguished	  two	  English	  cases	  where	  the	  court	  upheld	  a	  reverse	  onus	  provision	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  offence	  of	  possession	  of	  a	  bladed	  knife	  in	  a	  public	  place	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  that	  act	  was	  inherently	  dangerous	  in	  a	  public	  place	  whereas	  it	  was	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  with	  possession	  of	  an	  imitation	  firearm,	  especially	  when	  it	  was	  possessed	  in	  private	  premises.23	  	  	  This	  distinction	  is	  hardly	  convincing	  and	  could	  not	  explain	  why	  a	  defendant	  could	  still	  be	  convicted	  notwithstanding	  that	  he	  was	  able	  to	  raise	  a	  doubt	  of	  the	  dangerous	  purpose	  of	  possessing	  a	  bladed	  knife	  in	  public.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  rejected	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  possession	  of	  an	  imitation	  firearm	  was	  peculiarly	  within	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  defendant.	  There	  was	  simply	  no	  inherent	  or	  abnormal	  difficulty	  of	  proving	  knowledge,	  which	  in	  many	  cases	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  inference	  from	  facts	  proved.	  	  Nor	  had	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  found	  it	  convincing	  that	  the	  prosecution	  could	  only	  be	  made	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  Secretary	  for	  Justice,	  as	  the	  fairness	  of	  a	  trial	  should	  not	  be	  dependent	  on	  someone’s	  decision	  of	  whether	  there	  should	  be	  a	  prosecution.	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  comments,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  those	  situations	  where	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  would	  ever	  be	  justified,	  albeit	  that	  those	  situations	  have	  to	  be	  extremely	  rare	  and	  exceptional.	  	  	  	   Another	  difficult	  issue	  is	  whether	  strict	  liability	  or	  absolute	  liability	  offences	  can	  ever	  be	  justified.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  strict	  liability	  offences	  refer	  to	  offences	  which	  do	  not	  require	  the	  proof	  of	  a	  criminal	  intent,	  whereas	  absolute	  liability	  offences	  do	  not	  require	  the	  proof	  of	  any	  criminal	  intent	  and	  do	  not	  allow	  any	  defence.	  	  	  It	  is	  a	  fine	  distinction,	  and	  could	  well	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  legislative	  drafting,	  whether	  a	  provision	  imposes	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  mens	  rea	  of	  an	  offence	  on	  the	  defendant,	  or	  whether	  a	  provision	  creates	  a	  strict	  or	  absolute	  liability	  offence	  so	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  prosecution	  to	  prove	  the	  mental	  element	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  conviction,	  with	  or	  without	  a	  possibility	  of	  a	  defence	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  criminal	  intent.	  	  The	  court	  has	  adopted	  a	  fairly	  liberal	  and	  flexible	  approach	  not	  to	  be	  dictated	  by	  how	  the	  offence	  is	  formulated,	  but	  what	  in	  substance	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  offence	  are.	  	  While	  the	  court	  would	  be	  slow	  to	  accept	  that	  a	  strict	  or	  absolute	  liability	  offence	  is	  intended	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  clear	  statutory	  language,	  it	  has	  also	  held	  that	  an	  absolute	  or	  strict	  liability	  offence	  is	  not	  per	  se	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	  	  They	  would	  have	  to	  be	  justified	  by	  satisfying	  the	  rationality	  and	  proportionality	  tests,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  in	  HKSAR	  v	  Hung	  Chan	  Wa	  (2006)	  9	  HKCFAR	  614	  where	  the	  reverse	  onus	  provisions	  in	  the	  Dangerous	  Drug	  Ordinance	  were	  struck	  down	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  imposing	  a	  legal	  burden	  on	  the	  defendant.	  23	  Para	  40.	  	  The	  two	  English	  cases	  are	  L	  v	  DPP	  [2003]	  QB	  137	  and	  R	  v	  Matthews	  [2003]	  2	  Cr	  App	  R	  19.	  	  See	  also	  Downey	  v	  The	  Queen	  (1992)	  90	  DLR	  (4th)	  449.	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of	  an	  absolute	  offence	  imposing	  a	  custodial	  sentence,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  further	  justified	  as	  not	  being	  an	  arbitrary	  deprivation	  of	  liberty.	  	  In	  general,	  the	  court	  tends	  to	  view	  these	  offences	  with	  great	  suspicion	  and	  would	  readily	  read	  into	  these	  offences	  a	  defence	  of	  reasonable	  but	  mistaken	  belief.	  	  However,	  in	  rare	  circumstances	  when	  protection	  of	  a	  minor	  is	  involved,	  the	  court	  was	  prepared	  to	  uphold	  an	  absolute	  offence	  of	  having	  sexual	  intercourse	  with	  a	  girl	  below	  the	  age	  of	  16	  even	  when	  the	  offence	  admitted	  no	  defence	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  age	  of	  the	  girl,	  as	  the	  offence	  did	  satisfy	  the	  tests	  of	  rationality	  and	  proportionality.24	  	  	  	  	   Despite	  the	  enlightening	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal,	  the	  commitment	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  is	  only	  under	  real	  challenge	  when	  the	  courts	  begin	  to	  balance	  constitutional	  rights	  with	  other	  competing	  interests.	  	  Should	  it	  be	  considered	  just	  as	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  in	  the	  balancing	  process,	  or	  should	  it	  carry	  great	  weight	  which	  should	  only	  be	  displaced	  upon	  cogent	  and	  persuasive	  justifications	  and	  having	  considered	  the	  fundamental	  values	  of	  the	  rights	  concerned?	  	  	  Yeung	  Chung	  Ming	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Police	  is	  a	  good	  illustration.	  25	  	  	  In	  that	  case,	  a	  police	  officer	  who	  was	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  was	  suspended	  from	  duties	  pending	  his	  trial.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  had	  his	  salary	  withheld	  pursuant	  to	  section	  17	  of	  the	  Police	  Force	  Ordinance,	  which	  authorized	  the	  Commissioner	  to	  withhold	  not	  more	  than	  half	  of	  his	  salary.	  The	  withheld	  salary	  would	  be	  returned	  to	  the	  police	  officer	  if	  he	  was	  eventually	  acquitted.	  	  	  He	  challenged	  the	  withholding	  of	  his	  salary	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  his	  right	  to	  be	  presumed	  innocent,	  as	  such	  a	  decision	  appeared	  to	  treat	  him	  as	  a	  person	  who	  might	  be	  guilty	  and	  it	  was	  not	  demonstrably	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  any	  societal	  objective.	  	  This	  argument	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  by	  a	  majority,	  who	  held	  that	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  was	  essentially	  an	  element	  of	  a	  fair	  trial.	  	  Where	  a	  person	  is	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  criminal	  process,	  and	  when	  the	  authority	  takes	  action	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  person	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  office	  merely	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  might	  be	  guilty	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  view	  that	  he	  is	  guilty),	  there	  would	  be	  no	  violation	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	  	  	  It	  was	  held	  that	  the	  correct	  test	  was	  whether	  the	  Commissioner’s	  decision	  to	  withhold	  any	  proportion	  of	  the	  pay	  of	  an	  interdicted	  officer	  implied	  a	  view	  that	  the	  officer	  was	  guilty.	  	  As	  the	  police	  officer	  had	  been	  interdicted	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  such	  interdiction	  was	  in	  the	  public	  interest,	  and	  having	  been	  interdicted,	  he	  was	  relieved	  from	  his	  duties	  and	  not	  required	  to	  perform	  any	  work,	  the	  decision	  to	  withhold	  his	  salary	  did	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  officer	  was	  guilty.	  	  	  	  	   This	  explanation	  is	  problematic.	  	  If	  the	  reason	  for	  withholding	  the	  salary	  is	  that	  the	  officer	  is	  not	  performing	  any	  duty	  during	  the	  period	  of	  interdiction,	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  So	  Wai	  Lun	  v	  HKSAR	  [2006]	  3	  HKLRD	  394	  at	  403H-­‐404C.	  25	  [2008]	  4	  HKC	  383.	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would	  be	  illogical	  to	  return	  the	  full	  amount	  to	  him	  even	  if	  he	  is	  eventually	  acquitted.	  	  The	  Government	  argued	  that	  the	  withheld	  salary	  was	  to	  defray	  the	  expense	  of	  paying	  someone	  else	  to	  do	  the	  suspended	  police	  officer’s	  work.	  	  This	  was	  rejected	  by	  Bokhary	  PJ	  in	  his	  dissenting	  judgment,	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  withholding	  salary	  on	  a	  suspended	  police	  officer	  would	  be	  much	  heavier	  than	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  public	  purse,	  especially	  if	  the	  interdiction	  lasted	  for	  any	  considerable	  period	  of	  time.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  logical	  conclusion	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  withheld	  salary	  should	  not	  be	  returned	  to	  the	  suspended	  officer	  as	  the	  withholding	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  his	  conviction	  or	  acquittal.	  	  The	  Government	  further	  argued	  that	  public	  sentiment	  found	  it	  objectionable	  that	  officers	  who	  were	  eventually	  found	  guilty	  and	  dismissed	  should	  be	  paid	  in	  the	  meantime.	  	  Yet	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  prejudice	  that	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  is	  to	  guard	  against.	  	  As	  Bokhary	  PJ	  pointed	  out,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  to	  warrant	  such	  a	  conclusion,	  as	  there	  could	  well	  be	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  responses	  from	  the	  public.	  	  	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Court	  approached	  the	  issue	  from	  the	  societal	  point	  of	  view,	  Bokhary	  PJ	  adopted	  a	  starting	  point	  emphasizing	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  right	  to	  be	  presumed	  innocent.	  	  As	  the	  learned	  judge	  put	  it:26	  	  	   “As	  I	  see	  it,	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  reflects	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  members	  of	  a	  free	  society	  generally	  approach	  each	  other	  unless	  and	  until	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  otherwise	  in	  any	  particular	  instance.	  	  And	  even	  then,	  that	  general	  approach	  is	  departed	  from	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  called	  for	  by	  such	  reason.	  	  The	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  stands	  in	  the	  way	  of	  arbitrary	  treatment	  generally.	  	  Many	  forms	  of	  treatment	  are	  recognized	  as	  arbitrary	  precisely	  because	  the	  persons	  subjected	  to	  it	  are	  presumed	  innocent.	  	  In	  a	  free	  society,	  persons	  are	  surrounded	  and	  protected	  by	  a	  network	  of	  interrelated	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  a	  fundamental	  nature…..	  	  If	  a	  society	  is	  to	  remain	  truly	  free,	  the	  entirety	  of	  its	  network	  or	  continuum	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  must	  be	  carefully	  kept	  in	  good	  repair.	  	  The	  thing	  to	  fear	  is	  too	  narrow	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence,	  not	  too	  wide	  an	  interpretation	  of	  it.””	  	  Thus,	  Bokhary	  PJ	  subjected	  the	  decision	  of	  withholding	  the	  salary	  of	  the	  suspended	  officer	  to	  great	  scrutiny.	  	  He	  took	  into	  account	  the	  need	  for	  a	  constitution	  to	  protect	  the	  weak,	  particularly	  in	  an	  employment	  relationship	  where	  the	  employee	  is	  normally	  the	  weaker	  party,	  and	  the	  general	  contractual	  right	  of	  an	  employee	  to	  be	  paid	  his	  wages	  in	  full	  unless	  and	  until	  he	  is	  lawfully	  dismissed.	  	  He	  did	  not	  find	  the	  justifications	  convincing,	  and	  held	  that	  section	  17	  of	  the	  Police	  Force	  Ordinance	  unconstitutional	  as	  it	  failed	  the	  test	  of	  legitimate	  need,	  rationality	  and	  proportionality.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  majority	  and	  the	  minority	  lies	  not	  so	  much	  in	  the	  formal	  rhetoric	  of	  their	  approach,	  but	  how	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ibid,	  at	  397-­‐398,	  paras	  42-­‐43.	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court	  perceives	  the	  relative	  importance	  between	  a	  fundamental	  right	  and	  wider	  competing	  societal	  interests.	  	  Without	  reflecting	  on	  the	  fundamental	  values	  in	  our	  society,	  a	  balancing	  process	  could	  easily	  lead	  to	  the	  triumph	  of	  wider	  societal	  interests	  when	  protection	  of	  such	  societal	  interests	  may	  not	  have	  to	  undermine	  a	  fundamental	  right.	  	  
	   HKSAR	  v	  Hung	  Chan	  Wa	  presented	  a	  different	  type	  of	  challenge	  to	  the	  judiciary.27	  After	  the	  decision	  in	  Sin	  Yau	  Ming,	  the	  Dangerous	  Drug	  Ordinance	  was	  amended.	  	  The	  amended	  sections	  47(1)	  and	  (2)	  continued	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  double	  presumption	  of	  possession	  of	  the	  drug	  (albeit	  with	  a	  more	  limited	  scope),	  and	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  drug	  in	  the	  offence	  of	  drug	  trafficking,	  and	  they	  imposed	  a	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  defendant.	  	  	  Adopting	  a	  remedial	  interpretation,	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  read	  down	  and	  upheld	  these	  provisions	  as	  imposing	  only	  an	  evidential	  and	  not	  a	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  defendant.	  	  	  The	  difficult	  issue	  in	  this	  case	  was	  that	  many	  defendants	  had	  been	  convicted	  of	  this	  offence	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  failed	  to	  rebut	  the	  presumption	  of	  possession	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relevant	  dangerous	  drug.	  	  The	  Government	  was	  anxious	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  would	  not	  disturb	  previous	  convictions.	  	  It	  invited	  the	  court	  to	  apply	  its	  decision	  only	  prospectively,	  or	  to	  limit	  the	  retrospective	  effect	  of	  its	  judgment.	  	  	   This	  raises	  a	  difficult	  and	  complex	  issue	  in	  constitutional	  law	  of	  a	  constitutional	  judgment	  disturbing	  the	  past	  (by	  upsetting	  a	  large	  number	  of	  previous	  judgments)	  or	  jeopardizing	  the	  future	  (by	  creating	  a	  legal	  vacuum	  immediately	  after	  the	  judgment).28	  	  It	  involves	  a	  delicate	  balance	  of	  one’s	  right	  to	  constitutional	  remedies	  with	  finality	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  	  The	  solution	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  judicial	  conception	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  in	  a	  particular	  constitutional	  system,	  hence	  opening	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  different	  jurisdictions	  may	  choose	  to	  adopt	  a	  different	  approach.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  has	  rejected	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  power	  to	  pronounce	  its	  judgment	  prospectively,29	  whereas	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  was	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  existence,	  albeit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  (2006)	  9	  HKCFAR	  614.	  28	  For	  a	  more	  detail	  discussion,	  see	  J	  Chan,	  ‘Some	  Reflections	  on	  Remedies	  in	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2009)	  39	  HKLR	  321-­‐337;	  Andrew	  Li	  CJ, 'Reflections	  on	  the	  Retrospective	  and	  Prospective	  Effect	  of	  Constitutional	  Judgments'	  in	  Jessica	  Young	  &	  Rebecca	  Lee	  (eds),	  The	  Common	  Law	  Lecture	  Series	  2010	  (University	  of	  Hong	  Kong),	  pp	  21-­‐55;	  and	  Kevin	  Zervos,	  	  ‘Constitutional	  Remedies	  Under	  the	  Basic	  Law’	  (2010)	  40	  HKLJ	  687-­‐718.	  	  See	  also	  Koo	  Sze	  Yiu	  v	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  the	  
HKSAR	  (2006)	  9	  HKCFAR	  441	  where	  the	  court	  dealt	  with	  the	  aspect	  of	  jeopardizing	  the	  future	  when	  striking	  down	  a	  legal	  provision	  on	  covert	  surveillance	  was	  said	  to	  create	  great	  difficulties	  for	  the	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  	  29	  See	  Ha	  v	  State	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  (1997)	  189	  CLR	  465	  at	  503-­‐504.	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the	  exercise	  of	  this	  extraordinary	  power	  was	  confined	  to	  the	  most	  exceptional	  circumstances.30	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  to	  some	  extent	  avoided	  the	  issue	  by	  treating	  the	  matter	  as	  one	  of	  discretion	  to	  allow	  an	  appeal	  to	  be	  filed	  out	  of	  time.	  	  It	  refused	  to	  grant	  leave	  to	  appeal	  out	  of	  time	  merely	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  an	  authoritative	  judgment	  subsequent	  to	  the	  conviction	  has	  reversed	  the	  previous	  understanding	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  hence	  minimized	  the	  impact	  of	  its	  judgment	  on	  past	  convictions.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Court	  went	  to	  considerable	  length	  to	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  power	  of	  prospective	  overruling,	  and	  set	  out	  admirably	  in	  some	  clarity	  the	  principles	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  exercising	  this	  extraordinary	  power.	  	  	   It	  is	  understandable	  that	  the	  Court	  was	  reluctant	  to	  define	  exhaustively	  the	  exceptional	  circumstances	  that	  would	  justify	  its	  decision	  to	  extend	  the	  time	  limit	  for	  filing	  an	  appeal	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  law	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conviction	  was	  subsequently	  proved	  to	  be	  unconstitutional.	  	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  expressed	  no	  opinion	  on	  the	  correctness	  or	  otherwise	  of	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  
R	  v	  Kwok	  Hing	  Man.31	  	  	  In	  that	  case,	  386	  defendants	  were	  convicted	  of	  the	  offence	  of	  unlawful	  possession	  between	  the	  date	  when	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  came	  into	  effect	  and	  when	  the	  Privy	  Council	  upheld	  the	  decision	  of	  unconstitutionality	  of	  the	  offence	  in	  Lee	  Kwong-­‐kut	  two	  years	  later.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  defendants	  had	  already	  served	  their	  sentence	  by	  then,	  and	  the	  time	  limit	  for	  appeal	  had	  long	  expired.	  	  They	  applied	  to	  expunge	  their	  criminal	  records.	  	  In	  an	  exceptional	  move,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  consulted	  its	  full	  membership	  and	  decided	  to	  allow	  an	  appeal	  out	  of	  time	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  hence	  expunging	  386	  criminal	  convictions.	  	  Although	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  in	  Hung	  Chan	  Wa	  did	  not	  express	  any	  view	  on	  the	  correctness	  of	  Kwok	  Hing	  Man,	  and	  though	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  any	  court	  would	  not	  find	  it	  attractive	  to	  expunge	  a	  large	  number	  of	  previous	  convictions	  when	  the	  time	  limit	  for	  their	  appeal	  had	  long	  expired,	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  the	  court	  has	  no	  real	  choice	  in	  such	  circumstances.	  	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  any	  court	  to	  uphold	  the	  convictions	  of	  a	  non-­‐existent	  offence	  by	  hiding	  behind	  a	  technical	  point	  of	  refusing	  to	  allow	  an	  appeal	  out	  of	  time.	  	  This	  would	  particularly	  be	  the	  situation	  if	  the	  defendants	  are	  still	  in	  custody.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  longer	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  or	  the	  Basic	  Law	  is	  in	  existence,	  the	  greater	  the	  risk	  that	  this	  would	  happen.	  	  In	  that	  situation,	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  liberty	  of	  the	  person	  shall	  prevail	  over	  the	  finality	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  and	  that	  the	  court	  should	  be	  slow	  to	  adopt	  prospective	  overruling	  even	  if	  it	  means	  setting	  aside	  a	  large	  number	  of	  previous	  criminal	  convictions,	  and	  should	  not	  do	  so	  if	  personal	  liberty	  is	  ever	  at	  stake.	  	  	  
Statutory	  Interference	  with	  the	  Right	  against	  Self-­‐Incrimination	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Re	  Spectrum	  Plus	  Ltd	  [2005]	  2	  AC	  680.	  	  31	  	  [1994]	  2	  HKCLR	  160.	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   One	  of	  the	  consequences	  flowing	  from	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  and	  hence	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  being	  on	  the	  prosecution	  is	  that	  an	  accused	  has	  a	  right	  to	  remain	  silent.	  	  He	  has	  no	  duty	  to	  assist	  the	  prosecution	  and	  has	  a	  right	  not	  to	  be	  compelled	  to	  incriminate	  himself.	  	  	  Although	  commonly	  described	  as	  a	  “privilege”,	  this	  is	  indeed	  a	  fundamental	  right	  that	  forms	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  and	  the	  right	  to	  be	  presumed	  innocent.	  32	  This	  common	  law	  right	  is	  “primarily	  designed	  to	  protect	  against	  improper	  compulsion	  by	  the	  authorities	  and	  the	  obtaining	  of	  evidence	  through	  methods	  of	  coercion	  or	  oppression	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  will	  of	  the	  accused.”33	  	  It	  is	  so	  deep-­‐rooted	  in	  English	  law	  that	  reliability	  of	  the	  evidence	  by	  itself	  was	  held	  to	  be	  insufficient	  to	  justify	  an	  abrogation	  of	  this	  right.34	  This	  right	  exists	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  criminal	  process,	  and	  embodies	  a	  cluster	  of	  rights	  or	  immunities	  which	  differ	  in	  nature,	  origin,	  incidence	  and	  importance.35	  Unfortunately,	  this	  common	  law	  right	  is	  also	  ameliorated	  by	  numerous	  statutory	  inroads,	  which	  are	  almost	  as	  old	  as	  the	  right	  itself.36	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  statutory	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  at	  the	  investigation	  stage,	  leading	  to	  direct	  or	  derivative	  use	  of	  the	  incriminating	  material	  at	  a	  later	  criminal	  process.37	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  first	  case	  to	  reach	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  HKSAR	  v	  
Lee	  Ming	  Tee.	  38	  	  In	  that	  case	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ordered	  a	  permanent	  stay	  of	  prosecution	  for	  an	  abuse	  of	  process	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  compelled	  information	  collected	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  company	  investigation	  was	  disclosed	  to	  the	  police	  and	  led	  to	  subsequent	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  the	  defendants	  for	  various	  counts	  of	  conspiracy	  to	  defraud	  and	  false	  accounting.	  	  Under	  section	  143	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  A	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Independent	  Commission	  Against	  Corruption	  (2012)	  15	  HKCFAR	  362	  at	  373,	  para	  13,	  per	  Bokhary	  and	  Chan	  PPJ.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  terms	  “privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination”,	  “right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination”	  and	  “the	  right	  to	  silence”	  are	  used	  interchangeably.	  33	  Allan	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  12,	  at	  para	  50.	  [check	  for	  original	  source]	  34	  Lam	  Chi	  Ming	  v	  The	  Queen	  [1991]	  2	  AC	  212	  at	  220,	  222	  (PC);	  R	  v	  S	  [2008]	  EWCA	  Crim	  2177,	  para	  16;	  Saunders	  v	  UK	  (1996)	  23	  EHRR	  313	  35	  For	  a	  useful	  classification,	  see	  R	  v	  Director	  of	  Serious	  Fraud	  Office,	  ex	  parte	  
Smith	  [1993]	  AC	  1	  at	  30,	  where	  Lord	  Mustill	  identified	  six	  different	  categories	  of	  immunities.	  36	  Ibid	  at	  40.	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  Fu	  Kin	  Chi	  Willy	  v	  Secretary	  for	  Justice	  [1998]	  1	  HKLRD	  271	  (abrogation	  of	  the	  common	  law	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  by	  the	  Police	  Force	  Ordinance	  in	  police	  disciplinary	  enquiry)	  and	  Chan	  Sze	  Ting	  v	  
HKSAR	  (1997-­‐98)	  1	  HKCFAR	  46	  (abrogation	  of	  the	  common	  law	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  by	  s	  13	  of	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Bribery	  Ordinance).	  	  No	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  arguments	  were	  invoked	  in	  these	  cases.	  37	  For	  a	  helpful	  analysis,	  see	  S	  Young,	  ‘A	  Decade	  of	  Self-­‐Incrimination	  in	  the	  HKSAR’	  (2007)	  37	  HKLJ	  475.	  	  38	  (2001)	  4	  HKCFAR	  133.	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Companies	  Ordinance,	  the	  Financial	  Secretary	  may	  order	  an	  investigation	  by	  an	  Inspector	  into	  the	  affairs	  of	  a	  company.	  	  Section	  145(3A)	  further	  provides	  that	  the	  officers	  of	  the	  company	  could	  not	  refuse	  to	  answer	  a	  question	  from	  the	  inspector	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  self-­‐incrimination,	  save	  that	  the	  question	  and	  answer	  could	  not	  be	  adduced	  as	  evidence	  against	  them	  in	  subsequent	  criminal	  proceedings	  if	  the	  person	  claimed	  privilege	  before	  answering	  the	  question.	  	  The	  defendant	  relied,	  inter	  alia,	  on	  Article	  11(2)(g)	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  which	  provided	  that	  ‘in	  the	  determination	  of	  any	  criminal	  charge	  against	  him,	  everyone	  shall	  be	  entitled…	  not	  to	  be	  compelled	  to	  testify	  against	  himself	  or	  to	  confess	  guilty’,	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  derivative	  use	  of	  incriminating	  evidence	  contravened	  Article	  11(2)(g)	  or	  more	  generally,	  the	  right	  to	  fair	  trial.	  	  The	  Secretary	  for	  Justice	  appealed	  and	  argued	  that	  section	  145(3A)	  did	  not	  prevent	  derivative	  use	  of	  the	  self-­‐incriminating	  material,	  and	  such	  use	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  	  	   The	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  allowed	  the	  appeal	  and	  set	  aside	  the	  order	  of	  permanent	  stay.	  	  Riberio	  PJ,	  delivering	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court,	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  free-­‐standing	  common	  law	  right	  against	  derivative	  use	  of	  incriminating	  evidence,	  and	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  once	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  was	  abrogated	  without	  any	  express	  restriction	  on	  their	  use,	  it	  necessarily	  permitted	  unrestricted	  use	  of	  the	  incriminating	  information.	  	  Insofar	  as	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  is	  concerned,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  Article	  11(2)(g)	  has	  no	  application	  as	  there	  was	  no	  criminal	  proceedings	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  information	  was	  elicited,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  inherent	  unfairness	  in	  permitting	  derivative	  use	  of	  incriminating	  evidence,	  taking	  the	  trial	  process	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  the	  court’s	  discretion	  to	  exclude	  evidence.	  	  	   In	  that	  case,	  the	  prosecution	  gave	  an	  undertaking	  not	  to	  rely	  on	  any	  of	  the	  oral	  interviews	  of	  the	  defendants	  or	  any	  of	  their	  comments	  on	  the	  draft	  transcript	  or	  on	  the	  draft	  report,	  or	  to	  seek	  to	  cross-­‐examine	  them	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  materials.	  	  Nor	  had	  the	  defendants	  been	  able	  to	  identify	  any	  matters	  that	  were	  to	  be	  used	  at	  the	  trial	  as	  specifically	  derived	  from	  the	  compelled	  information.39	  	  Thus,	  arguably	  the	  question	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  through	  derivative	  use	  of	  compelled	  information	  did	  not	  arise	  at	  all	  and	  the	  decision	  could	  be	  supported	  on	  that	  basis.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  case	  relying	  on	  derivative	  use,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  unfair	  or	  unreasonable	  to	  require	  the	  accused	  to	  identify	  the	  matters	  that	  were	  said	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  incriminating	  information,	  and	  to	  show	  that	  but	  for	  the	  incriminating	  information	  such	  derived	  matters	  would	  not	  have	  been	  available,	  and	  once	  the	  accused	  is	  able	  to	  discharge	  the	  evidential	  burden,	  it	  would	  be	  for	  the	  prosecution	  to	  show	  that	  it	  had	  acquired	  the	  evidence	  independently	  and	  without	  reliance	  on	  the	  compelled	  information,	  or	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  do	  so,	  to	  show	  that	  the	  court	  should	  still	  exercise	  its	  discretion	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  At	  157D-­‐F	  and	  157J-­‐158A.	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admit	  the	  evidence	  despite	  its	  being	  obtained	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  accused’s	  right	  	  against	  self-­‐incrimination.	  	  This	  is	  indeed	  the	  position	  in	  Canada,	  where	  the	  court	  tried	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  protecting	  the	  public	  from	  corporate	  fraud.	  	  	   Instead,	  the	  Court	  rejected	  the	  Canadian	  approach,	  not	  on	  any	  principle	  but	  merely	  on	  a	  vague	  assertion	  that	  the	  Canadian	  approach	  was	  developed	  in	  a	  highly	  specific	  context.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  protection	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  in	  section	  13	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  was	  regarded	  as	  too	  narrowly	  formulated	  and	  hence	  the	  Canadian	  courts	  tried	  to	  extend	  the	  constitutional	  protection	  through	  “the	  principle	  of	  fundamental	  justice”	  under	  section	  7	  of	  the	  Charter.	  	  It	  does	  not	  follow	  therefore	  that	  the	  constitutional	  principles	  developed	  thereunder	  are	  necessarily	  inapplicable	  beyond	  the	  Canadian	  context.	  	  Indeed,	  “the	  principle	  of	  fundamental	  justice”	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  the	  justice	  system.	  	  Riberio	  PJ	  was	  contended	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  English	  common	  law	  decision	  of	  Brown	  v	  
Scott,	  which	  was	  a	  highly	  criticized	  decision	  and	  which	  was	  in	  any	  event	  a	  case	  of	  direct	  use	  rather	  than	  derivative	  use	  of	  incriminating	  information.40	  	  
Derivative	  Use:	  A	  Free	  Standing	  Right	  under	  the	  Common	  Law?	  	   Is	   there	   no	   basis	   for	   a	   free-­‐standing	   right	   against	   derivative	   use	   in	   the	  common	  law?	  This	  may	  require	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  fundamental	  values	  of	  the	  protection	   of	   the	   right	   against	   self-­‐incrimination.	   	   In	  Lamb v. Munster, Stephen J 
described the right in these words: 41 
  
  “When the subject is fully examined, it will I think be found that the privilege 
 extends to protect a man from answering any question which ‘would in the 
 opinion of the judge have a tendency to expose the witness, or the wife or 
 husband of the witness, to any criminal charge’:  Stephen's Dig. of the Law of 
 Ev. 3rd ed. art. 120, p. 121.  That is what I understand by the phrase ‘criminating 
 himself’.  It is not that a man must be guilty of an offence and say substantially, 
 ‘I am guilty of the offence, but am not going to furnish evidence of it.’  I do not 
 think the privilege is so narrow as that, for then it would be illusory.  The extent 
 of the privilege is I think this:  the man may say, "If you are going to bring a 
 criminal charge, or if I have reason to think a criminal charge is going to be 
 brought against me, I will hold my tongue.  Prove what you can, but I am 
 protected from furnishing evidence against myself out of my own mouth." 
If the right against incrimination means that an accused cannot be compelled to give 
evidence that he has made a video record of his committing a crime, what is the 
justification for admitting the video in evidence when the video would not have been 
discovered but for his compelled testimony?  This would be no different from convicting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  [2001]	  SLT	  59.	  	  See	  178-­‐179	  of	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal.	  41	  	  (1882), 10 Q.B.D. 110, at pp. 112-13:	  
17	  	  
him “out of his own mouth”, metaphorically if not literally.  It would of course be 
different if the police was able to find the video independently without his compelled 
testimony.  The position was best explained by the US Supreme Court in Katisgar v 
United States, where the majority of the Court held:42 
   
 “We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the 
 scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to 
 compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.  While a grant of immunity must 
 afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not 
 be broader.  Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from 
 prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the 
 witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment 
 privilege.  The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes 
 it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.  Its sole concern is to afford protection 
 against being “forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of `penalties 
 affixed to . . . criminal acts.'"  Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as 
 well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this 
 protection.  It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled 
 testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead 
 to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.  [Emphasis original.] 
  
Thus, it seems that, as a matter of logic and principle, there is a powerful case that the 
protection against self-incrimination must include the prohibition of both direct and 
derivative use.  The underlying concern is the same be it direct or derivative use, 
namely that a person cannot be compelled to give incriminating evidence against 
himself and be forced to convict himself out of his own mouth.  
 Riberio PJ, however, held that there was no common law derivative use 
immunity and if there is any such common law derivative use immunity, it has been 
abrogated by s 145(3A).  It appears that the learned judge has failed to distinguish 
four different though inter-related issues.  Firstly, does the common law recognize 
derivative use immunity?  Secondly, has section 145(3A) abrogated such common 
law immunity?  Thirdly, there is the court’s general residual discretionary power to 
exclude relevant evidence in order to ensure a fair trial; and fourthly, it is necessary to 
establish a causal link between the derivative evidence and the compelled 
incriminating evidence. The learned judge was preoccupied with the second question 
and his categorical denial of a free-standing common law derivative use immunity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  406 U.S. 441 (1972).  See also the powerful judgment of Wilson J in Thomson 
Newspaper Ltd v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) (1990) 67 DLR 
(4th) 161. 	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(the first question) has to be considered in the light of his pre-occupation, rightly so 
on the facts, with the second question of statutory abrogation. 
 The learned judge first referred to Sorby v The Commonwealth,43 and was 
prepared to accept that “an unabrogated privilege against self-incrimination, that is, 
privilege to decline to answer questions, necessarily carried with it not only protection 
against direct but also derivative use of any self-incriminating answer.”44 This must 
be correct (the first question).  The learned judge distinguished this case on the 
particular wordings of section 6DD of the Royal Commissions Act 1902, which 
imposed a general restriction on direct use of compelled evidence without expressly 
abrogating the right against self-incrimination, and held that the expressed abrogation 
of the right in section 145(3A) left no room for the survival of any common law 
derivative use immunity (the second question).  Hamilton v Oades and Corporate 
Affairs Commission of New South Wales could be explained on the same ground, 
namely that section 541(12) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code expressly 
abrogated the right against self-incrimination and that was sufficient to abrogate both 
direct use and derivative use.  Mason CJ gave a further reason that it would be 
difficult for Parliament to provide for specific protection against derivative use by 
reason of the problem of proving that other evidence was derivative.45  The difficulty 
of proving a causal relationship between the derivative evidence and the incriminating 
evidence (the fourth question) is a real limit on the effectiveness of protecting 
derivative use, but it is not an answer that there is no derivative use immunity or that 
the statute necessarily abrogates derivative use, the latter of which remains a question 
of legislative intent in each case. 
 Riberio PJ next referred to Lam Chi Ming v The Queen, the issue of which was 
whether certain video recording of re-enacting the crime scene and the discovery of 
the murder weapon were admissible evidence when the confession made by the 
accused which led to the re-enactment of the crime scene and the recovery of the 
murder weapon was held involuntarily made and hence inadmissible.46  It held that 
where a confession was ruled to have been involuntary made and inadmissible, 
evidence derived by the police from the knowledge acquired through that confession 
might still be admissible provided that the derivative evidence could be adduced 
without any reliance on the excluded confession.  This goes to the fourth question 
above (causal linkage) and reinforces the point that if there is a causal linkage, the 
derivative use must be protected unless otherwise abrogated.  The learned judge’s 
statement that “the common law admits independent evidence against the accused 
even though it is derivative evidence obtained by using the excluded confession 
(subject to the court’s discretionary power to exclude such evidence)” begs the 
question of what ‘independent evidence’ means.  It is not supported by the fact of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  (1983)	  152	  CLR	  281	  at	  293-­‐293,	  per	  GibbS	  CJ.	  44	  At	  166E.	  45	  	  (1989)	  166	  CLR	  486	  at	  496).	  46	  [1911]	  3	  AC	  212.	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Lam Chi Ming where the Privy Council held that there was a strong causal link 
between the video recording and the involuntary confession and therefore the video 
was inadmissible, thus confirming the derivative use immunity.  The statement of 
Lord Hoffmann in R v Hertfordshire County Council, ex p Green Environmental 
Industries Ltd,47 which referred back to Lam Chi Ming and the 18th century case of R 
v Warickshall,48 have to be considered in the same light.   
 Finally, the learned judge dismissed the relevance of two civil cases 
concerning Anton Piller Order.  In Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information 
Centre, Lord Wilberforce held that the judicial order did not abrogate the right against 
self-incrimination, thus protecting the defendant from both direct and derivative use 
of any answer provided.   Lord Wilberforce expressed the concern that even if there 
were an undertaking not to use the information obtained in criminal proceedings, it 
would not sufficiently protect the defendant from derivative use of the information.  
Thus, whether an undertaking is wide enough to prevent derivative use would depend 
on its wordings, and it may be jumping the gun to conclude from this that if the right 
against self-incrimination were to be abrogated by judicial order, there would be no 
residual common law derivative use immunity,49 or that an abrogation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, even if accompanied by an undertaking against direct use, 
would not prevent derivative use.50  It is very much a matter of drafting in each case. 
 In conclusion, the learned judge’s statement that there was no free standing 
common law derivative immunity is probably unnecessarily sweeping.  It is submitted 
that the right against self-incrimination must include protection against both direct 
and derivative use.  Whether a statutory provision abrogates both direct and derivative 
use is a matter of construction the outcome of which depends on the context of each 
case.  There are two possible approaches.  The first is that an expressed restriction on 
direct use does not preclude derivative use: expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  This 
is typical of the common law approach to statutory interpretation and is the approach 
adopted by the learned judge. The other is that unless otherwise expressly excluded, a 
fundamental right is deemed not to be excluded, and hence, in the absence of clear 
and unambiguous language, the common law derivative use immunity is preserved. 
This approach is more consistent with the modern liberal approach to construing 
constitutional rights.  The learned judge cannot be faulted for choosing one of the two 
approaches, especially when this case was decided in the early days of the transition 
of sovereignty when the court was still feeling its way towards constitutional law 
interpretation, though the approach that he has adopted is not as rights-friendly as the 
other approach. If the statute does not abrogate derivative use, it is argued that the 
court should determine whether the causal link between the compelled evidence and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  	  [2000]	  2	  AC	  412	  at	  421.	  48	  (1783)	  1	  Leach	  263.	  49	  At	  168E-­‐169H.	  50	  Indeed,	  in	  AT&T	  Istel	  Ltd	  v	  Tully	  [1993]	  AC	  45,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  found	  the	  undertaking	  wide	  enough	  to	  cover	  both	  direct	  use	  and	  derivative	  use.	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the derivative evidence is so remote that it could not be considered rationally that the 
derivative evidence came from the mouth of the compelled (the rationality test).  If 
such rational relationship cannot be established by the accused or is rebutted by the 
prosecution by showing that the incriminating evidence could be obtained 
independent of the derivative material, the derivative evidence should be admissible, 
subject to the court’s residual discretion to exclude evidence to ensure a fair trial.  On 
the other hand, if an accused could establish a causal link between the compelled 
material and the derivative evidence and that the prosecution could not show that it 
would be able to obtain the derivative evidence but for the compelled material, then 
the derivative evidence should be inadmissible as its admissibility would in the 
circumstances  compromise the fair hearing or the dignity of the judicial process, or 
that it would be disproportionate to admit such incriminating derivative evidence. 
Thus, instead of a categorical permission to use derivative evidence, its admissibility 
becomes a matter of remoteness and could be determined by the usual tests of 
rationality and proportionality.  
 
Determination of Criminal Charge 
 Article 10 of the Bill of Rights provided for the right to fair hearing in the 
determination of a criminal charge.  Article 11(2) then elaborates on the procedural 
protection in the determination of a criminal charge. Thus, to engage both Articles 10 
and 11(2), there has to be a ‘criminal charge.’  Decisions from the Strasbourg Court 
and English decisions on the Human Rights Act have consistently held that this is an 
autonomous concept which is not to be determined solely by domestic classification 
and that the concept is a matter of substance rather than form, for otherwise a State 
would be at liberty to avoid the protection of a fair trial by reclassifying its domestic 
process or by transferring what is essentially a criminal decision to an administrative 
body.  The logical conclusion would therefore be that if Article 10 is engaged because 
there is a criminal charge, then Article 11(2) should equally be engaged insofar as the 
procedural guarantees are applicable.  The two articles should rise and fall together.  
Strangely, this is not the effect of the Hong Kong decisions. 
 In Lee Ming Tee, as far as Article 11(2)(g) is concerned, the Court took a 
literal meaning of ‘criminal charge’ without much discussion and held that it did not 
apply as no charge had been preferred on the defendants at the time when the 
compelled information was sought.51 It also confined the protection of Article 11(2)(g) 
to testimonial immunity.  The Court then turned to Article 10.  It pointed out that the 
European Court of Human Rights felt able to derive the right against incrimination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Both decisions may be seen to be rather restrictive, though this could be justified on 
the facts of this case as it would have to stretch one’s imagination of the meaning of 
‘criminal charge’ when such charges were laid only four years after the taking of 
incriminating evidence.	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from the equivalent of the right to fair trial in Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and then assumed Article 10 was applicable and proceeded to 
consider whether derivative use was a violation of the right to fair hearing. This was 
hardly satisfactory, as the right to fair hearing under Article 10 is also engaged only 
‘in the determination of criminal charge.’  Unless the meaning of this phrase differs in 
Article 10 and 11(2)(g), the decision of the Court is internally inconsistent. 
 The same point was made by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Secretary 
for Justice v Latker that Article 11(2)(g).  Ma CJHC (as he then was) and Stuart-
Moore JA held that Article 11(2)(g) of the Bill of Rights had no application as this 
article was only engaged when a person had actually been charged with a criminal 
offence.  However, they agreed that the right to a fair trial under Article 10 was 
engaged, as once the identity of the driver of a vehicle that was involved in a traffic 
offence was provided, the inevitable reality was that a charge would have been laid.  
In contrast, Stock VP went into greater details by adopting an extended meaning of a 
“criminal charge” as “the official notification given to an individual by the competent 
authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence”.52  This liberal 
meaning would widen the scope of protection to the pre-trial investigation stage 
where the right against self-incrimination could arguably be of much greater 
significance.  Stock VP adopted a realistic view in assessing the nature of the notice 
requiring the provision of information of the identity of the driver, noting that the 
inquiry was conducted solely in order to seek information or evidence in order to 
support a criminal charge,53 and realistically the police did have an “element of 
suspicion” against the registered owner.  While the identity of the driver would not 
complete the traffic offence, it is an important element of the offence, and indeed, in 
most cases, the only missing part in the prosecution. The realistic approach adopted 
by Stock VP is much preferred over that of the Court.  However, Stock VP was silent 
on whether Article 11(2)(g) applied.  Indeed, if “criminal charge” bears the wider 
meaning as Stock VP has held, there is no reason why the same meaning should not 
apply to Article 11(2)(g), in both cases there was a criminal charge when the statutory 
notice to provide information was served.  
 The meaning of “criminal charge” was thoroughly considered in Koon Wing 
Kee v Insider Dealing Tribunal.54 The issue in this case was whether Articles 10 and 
11 of the Bill of Rights applied to proceedings before the Insider Dealing Tribunal. 
The Court of Final Appeal accepted the approach adopted by the European Court of 
Human Rights that in determining whether there is a ‘criminal charge’, the court 
would take into account (a) domestic classification of the offence; (b) the nature of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  At	  137I,	  para	  120.	  53	  At	  139,	  paras	  123	  and	  131-­‐133,	  preferring	  the	  minority	  view	  in	  Weh	  v	  Austria	  (2005)	  40	  EHRR	  37,	  at	  para	  0-­‐11..	  	  Since	  then	  the	  police	  has	  introduced	  a	  standard	  clause	  in	  the	  notice	  that	  consideration	  is	  given	  whether	  criminal	  prosecution	  would	  be	  taken	  out.	  54	  [(2008)	  11	  HKCFAR	  170.	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the offence; and (c) the nature and severity of the potential sanction.  While domestic 
classification would be taken as a starting point, it would not be conclusive. Indeed, 
the nature of the offence and the proceedings are more weighty consideration.   Thus, 
disciplinary proceedings, which do not concern the public at large, are usually taken 
to be of a non-criminal, non-penal character.  Proceedings under regulatory legislation 
whose purpose is essentially protective rather than punitive or deterrent may also not 
be considered “criminal”. Likewise, the revocation of a parole licence, which purpose 
was to protect the public and not to punish the offender, is not ‘criminal’ in nature.  
On the other hand, if the purpose is punitive in nature, or when a heavy penalty is 
imposed, these are strong indicia of a “criminal” process.  In that particular case, the 
Court found that insider dealing was an “insidious mischief” which threatened the 
integrity of financial markets and public confidence in the markets.  It involved 
dishonest misconduct of a misuse of price-sensitive information, and the penalty, 
which sought to leave a person engaging in such conduct out of pocket irrespective of 
any personal gain, was clearly punitive in nature.  The absence of a formal charge or a 
conviction that constituted a criminal record, and the absence of a provision for 
imprisonment did not attenuate its criminal character. 
 In this regard, the Court expressly endorsed a substantive approach that looked 
to substance rather than form.  Sir Anthony Mason held that “it is necessary to look 
beyond the absence of a formal charge and to ascertain whether a person is being 
called upon to answer an allegation of serious misconduct which, if determined 
against him, will result in punishment. To hold that the absence of a formal charge 
and the absence of a provision for the recording of a conviction in such circumstances 
take the proceedings outside the protection conferred by Arts 10 and 11 of the BOR 
would reduce substantially the protection conferred by these articles and facilitate the 
triumph of form over substance.’55  A similar approach has been adopted by the Court 
of Final Appeal in Yeung Chung Ming v Commissioner of Police, where the Court 
endorsed the application of the presumption of innocence to cover a declaration of 
guilt by the State following an arrest when no criminal charge was preferred.56 This 
approach is to be commended, and in light of these holdings, the remarks made by 
Riberio PJ in Lee Ming Tee and Ma CJHC in the Latkers case regarding the 
applicability of Article 11(2) must now be regarded as dubious.57 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  At	  192,	  para	  51.	  56	  [2008]	  4	  HKC	  383	  at	  394,	  citing	  Minelli	  v	  Switzerland	  (1983)	  5	  EHRR	  554.	  	  See	  also	  the	  dissenting	  judgment	  of	  Bokhary	  PJ,	  at	  396-­‐397	  57	  In	  light	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  Koon	  Wing	  Yee,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  notice	  requiring	  a	  registered	  owner	  of	  a	  vehicle	  to	  disclose	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  driver	  at	  the	  material	  time	  in	  the	  Latkers	  case	  amounted	  to	  a	  “criminal	  charge”	  and	  hence	  attracted	  the	  protection	  of	  Art	  11(2)(g).	  	  Since	  this	  case,	  the	  Government	  has	  inserted	  a	  new	  clause	  in	  the	  standard	  notice	  that	  the	  prosecution	  has	  not	  decided	  at	  this	  stage	  whether	  to	  prosecute	  or	  not.	  	  This	  clause	  may	  not	  achieve	  its	  purpose	  if	  the	  statistics	  show	  that	  there	  is	  criminal	  prosecution	  in	  the	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Approach to Constitutional Right against Self-Incrimination 
 The Court’s decision in Lee Ming Tee on the right to a fair hearing is equally 
disappointing.  It took as a starting point that direct use of compulsorily obtained self-
incriminating materials might be justified if it was not a disproportionate response to a 
serious social problem and did not undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial viewed 
in the round.  The Court then treated the issue as primarily one of a fair balance 
between meeting a serious social concern of corporate fraud that called for strong 
regulation, and ensuring an accused of a fair trial, taking into account the court’s 
inherent power to exclude evidence.  It had no difficulty in coming to a conclusion 
that “there is no inherent unfairness in establishing a person’s guilt by the use of 
reliable objective evidence obtained from an independent source, even if the 
acquisition of that evidence was facilitated by clues contained in the excluded 
admission.” 58   As noted above, the problem of this conclusion lies in what 
“independent source” means.  If it means that there is no causal relationship between 
the derivative evidence and the incriminating information, the conclusion is not 
controversial.  This seems to be what the learned judge has in mind, as his conclusion 
is preceded by a statement that “the privilege has no application to evidence which 
exists independently of the will of the accused.” There is of course no violation of the 
right against self-incrimination if there is no causal relationship between the 
derivative evidence and the incriminating information, but if this causal relationship is 
established, then the court has not really addressed the balancing process as such.  In 
this connection, it is disappointing that the learned judge was too ready to brush aside 
the Canadian authorities, which addressed separately the need to establish a causal 
relationship between the derivative evidence and the compelled incriminating matters. 
Instead of applying the proportionality test in the balancing process, the learned judge 
readily assumed the position that the judicial discretion to exclude remedy would be 
sufficient to ensure a fair trial.  
 Derivative use was cursorily mentioned in passing in A v Commissioner of 
Independent Commission Against Corruption.59  The issue in that case was primarily 
whether a person being compelled to provide information to the ICAC pursuant to the 
famous section 14 notice could claim the right against self-incrimination.  There was 
no expressed abrogation of the right, but the Court of Final Appeal concluded that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  cases	  following	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  driver,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  The	  court	  will	  consider	  the	  substance	  rather	  than	  the	  form.	  58	  At	  177F-­‐G.	  59	  (2012)	  15	  HKCFAR	  363,	  at	  405,	  para	  118:	  “It	  is	  no	  part	  of	  the	  appellant’s	  case	  that	  such	  derivative	  use	  would	  be	  unconstitutional.	  	  That	  is	  unsurprising	  since,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Lee	  Ming	  Tee	  and	  Koon	  Wing	  Yee,	  such	  a	  challenge	  would	  have	  little	  prospect	  of	  success.”	  (per	  Ribeiro	  PJ)	  Thus,	  derivative	  use	  was	  not	  in	  issue	  at	  all.	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Legislature clearly intended to abrogate the right.  This conclusion was impeccable.  
There was a general prohibition of direct use of the information in all proceedings, 
and the Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the only permissible use 
was to challenge the credibility of the person concerned on the inconsistencies 
between the compelled materials and his viva voce testimony in court. Given this 
limitation, it was held that there was a proper balance between societal interest and 
the right to a fair trial, and hence there was no violation of the Bill of Rights.  
 While the case could be decided on that basis, the Court made obiter remarks 
about derivative use. Bokhary and Chan PJJ, in their joint separate judgment, asserted 
that “there would be no point at all to s 14 or to the abrogation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination in regard thereto if derivative use cannot be made of material 
compelled under that section.  Derivative use is plainly necessary and a rational and 
proportionate response to such necessity.  It is constitutional.”60  This obiter statement 
was made without any argument and is unnecessarily sweeping if it means that 
derivative use is always constitutionally permissible.  Riberio PJ was more restrained, 
yet his treatment also shed light on the real justification of his decision in Lee Ming 
Tee.61  The learned judge first referred to the common pattern of those statutes that 
abrogated the right against self-incrimination to prohibit or restrict direct use. He then 
made the point, following Lee Ming Tee, that such prohibition did not in general seek 
to prohibit or had the effect of prohibiting derivative use, the reason being: 
 “Thus, there is usually no prohibition against using the compulsorily obtained 
 answers to develop new lines of inquiry; to identify sources of independent 
 evidence; to assist in formulating applications for search warrants; and so forth.  
 Such derivative use of the compelled answers does not raise any issue 
 concerning self-incrimination or admissibility since it is use which does not 
 involve any attempt to adduce the answers in evidence in any curial setting. 
 The law has always drawn a distinction between (inadmissible) compelled 
 answers themselves and (admissible) derivative evidence independently 
 developed from indications contained in the compelled answers.” (emphasis 
 provided) 
This justification is consistent with the above argument that ultimately the issue is one 
of remoteness.  When the derivative evidence can be independent developed, the 
causal link between the compelled material and the derivative evidence is too remote 
to warrant any finding of a violation of the right against self-incrimination, but the 
right would be upheld if such causal link could be established.  The real issue would 
then be what kind of causal link would be considered constitutionally acceptable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  At	  383,	  para	  38.	  61	  At	  394,	  paras	  76-­‐77.	  	  Ma	  CJ	  and	  Lord	  Hoffmann	  NPJ	  concurred	  with	  Ribeiro	  PJ.	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 While direct use is severely restricted in A v Commissioner for the ICAC, the 
direct use in Secretary for Justice v Latker goes to the heart of the criminal offence.62  
Section 63 of the Road Traffic Ordinance compels the registered owner of a vehicle to 
provide information to the police on the identity of the driver at the time of a 
suspected offence, in that case the offence being failing to comply with traffic signals.  
Failure to provide the information is itself an offence, which attracts a fine of $10,000 
and six months’ imprisonment.  The requirement to provide information applies to all 
road traffic offences, irrespective of their nature or gravity. The issue is whether this 
requirement violates the right of the registered owner against self-incrimination.   The 
Court of Appeal found no violation. 
 Ma CJHC approached the issue as one of a fair balance, namely, what is the 
fair balance to be struck between, on the one hand, the demands and interests of the 
general community and, on the other, the fundamental rights of the individual?63  This 
approach is reminiscent of that adopted by Ribeiro PJ in Lee Ming Tee as well.  
Taking into account the strong public interest in the effective regulation of motor 
vehicles and their use, the sheer number of motor vehicles on the road and the 
exposure of most members of the population to them, the minimal intrusion to the 
right against self-incrimination, and the availability of a defence of lack of knowledge, 
the Court considered that a fair balance has been struck.  This conclusion is not 
surprising, and is most likely to result from the fair balance test as formulated by Ma 
CJHC.  After all, it is difficult to balance individual right against societal interest and, 
in most cases, the logical consequence is that societal interest prevails.  Stock VP, 
whilst agreeing with the conclusion of the Court, pointed out the danger of this fair 
balance approach:64 
 “I would myself prefer, as a general rule when addressing derogations from 
 rights, to avoid an approach or test articulated in terms of a ‘fair balance’ 
 between ‘… on the one hand, the demands and interests of the general 
 community and, on the other, the fundamental rights of the individual.’ A test 
 expressed in those terms runs the danger, in my opinion, of undermining the 
 primacy of fundamental freedoms which, after all, reflect the interests of the 
 general community.  In cases where fundamental freedoms are absolute, no 
 derogation is permitted, so no question of ‘balance’ can arise.  Where the 
 freedom is not absolute, the starting point is always the freedom and any 
 derogation from it must, both as to the need for derogation and its extent, be 
 fully justified, albeit on societal grounds, by he who seeks to derogate.’  
 Adopting this approach, Stock VP addressed the respondent’s arguments in a 
more meticulous manner.  He considered it unfair to categorize the respondent’s 
arguments as treating the right against self-incrimination as an absolute right.  Unlike 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  [2009]	  2	  HKC	  100.	  63	  At	  118,	  para	  37.	  64	  At	  152,	  para	  160.	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the majority who was prepared to accept readily that there was a serious problem 
caused by motor vehicles despite the unsatisfactory state of the statistical evidence,65 
Stock VP was sympathetic to the magistrate who was troubled by the absence of 
evidence justifying the legislative measure under attack.  He found that the evidential 
gap was bridged by the legislative history and the debates in the Legislative 
Council.66 The learned judge also dismissed the suggestion that the identity of the 
driver was only one element of the traffic offence, as realistically this was the only 
crucial piece of evidence in the prosecution.67   
 
 The respondent relied on three salient features in this case, namely custodial 
sentence, indiscriminate nature of the requirement irrespective of the gravity of the 
offence, and available alternatives.  He attempted to distinguish Brown v Stott on the 
ground that, in that case, a custodial sentence for non-compliance was not an option 
and that the requirement to supply information applied only to serious or mere 
regulatory offences.  Ma CJHC found support for the need for custodial sentence in 
the legislative debates, and was prepared to accord the Legislature a margin of 
appreciation regarding such need.68  He pointed out that custodial sentence would 
only be imposed in the more serious situations, and that Hong Kong was not unique in 
imposing custodial sentence for non-compliance. Nor did he consider the 
indiscriminate scope of application a weighty factor.  Once ‘all offences under the 
Road Traffic Ordinance were regarded as part of an overall regulatory scheme to 
govern effectively the use of motor vehicles in Hong Kong and to protect the public 
from harm, it is of little consequence whether serious or minor offences are affected 
by section 63.’69  This is again exemplary of how the fair balance approach as 
advocated by Ma CJHC applied in practice.  In contrast, Stock VP considered that the 
threat of imprisonment carried a threat of compulsion which had to be justified with 
reference to the subject matter of the case.  A six month custodial sentence for non-
compliance might not be incommensurate with a serious offence of causing death by 
dangerous driving which carried a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, but it might 
appear disproportionate if it was applied to a minor offence of speeding with a 
maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment.70 What degree of compulsion is 
proportionate in a particular case was a matter of factual assessment for the tribunal, 
which had a power to exclude an admission if the circumstances in which it was 
obtained in a particular case were found to be oppressive. Stock VP reviewed the 
legislative history, which had given an account of the problems encountered (the hit 
and run situations) and the justifications for the introduction of the custodial sanction.  
Finally, he also considered the available alternatives, as ‘those who seek to justify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  At	  119,	  para	  42.	  66	  At	  148,	  paras	  148-­‐149.	  67	  At	  133,	  para	  132.	  68	  At	  121,	  para	  54.	  69	  Ibid,	  para	  55.	  70	  At	  147,	  para	  144.	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restrictions upon fundamental rights are bound to show that the restrictions go no 
further than are necessary for the protection of legitimate interests’.71 While a reverse 
onus clause which placed a burden on the registered owner to prove that he was not 
the driver of the vehicle at the material time may be a possible alternative, it was a 
more onerous violation of the right to be presumed innocent than the compulsory 
disclosure requirement.  In conclusion, given the significantly limited nature of the 
questioning permitted, and the fact that the provisions were directed at a class of 
persons who had subscribed to a regulatory regime, the problems that have been 
encountered, and the power of the tribunal to exclude the evidence if the 
circumstances in which it has been obtained in a particular case were oppressive so as 
to render the admission unsafe, Stock VP agreed with the majority that the 
compulsory requirement to disclose the identity of a driver was a proportionate 
response.  While the learned judge had come to the same conclusion as the majority 
of the court, the approach adopted by Stock VP is intellectually more rigorous and 
more in tune with the primacy of the fundamental rights.  In the words of Silke VP, 
the balance between the	  interests	  of	  the	  individual	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  society	  generally	  is	  not	  an	  exercise	  to	  be	  done	  on	  equal	  plane,	  but	  with	  a	  bias	  towards	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  individual.72	  
 
 While exclusion of incriminating evidence is a natural remedy for a violation 
of the right against self-incrimination, the Court of Final Appeal came up with a novel, 
albeit surprising, remedy in Koon Wing Yee v Insider Dealing Tribunal.73 In that case, 
sections 33(4) and (6) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance conferred on the 
Securities and Futures Commission wide investigatory powers and abrogated the right 
against self-incrimination.  It also expressly permitted the use of potentially self-
incriminating answers “for all purposes of the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance”.  
That is, direct use of self-incriminating material was permitted for proceedings before 
the Insider Dealing Tribunal. The Court of Final Appeal found that such direct use 
constituted a substantial intrusion into the right against self-incrimination and that the 
compelled answers “formed an important element in the evidence relied upon by the 
Tribunal in the findings which it made against the respondents.”74  In coming to this 
conclusion, the Court was heavily influenced by the fact that the Tribunal had power 
to impose a very heavy penalty, which was punitive in nature and which sought to 
deter insider dealing by leaving a person who engaged in such dealing substantially 
out of pocket, irrespective of whether that person had made any personal gain.75  
Instead of excluding the self-incriminating evidence or striking down the provision 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71At	  149,	  para	  151.	  72	  R	  v	  Sin	  Yau	  Ming,	  supra.	  73	  (2008)	  11	  HKCFAR	  170.	  74	  Ibid	  at	  199,	  para	  79.	  75	  Section	  23(1)(c)	  provides	  for	  an	  order	  of	  a	  penalty	  ‘of	  an	  amount	  not	  exceeding	  three	  times	  the	  amount	  of	  any	  profit	  gained	  or	  loss	  avoided	  by	  any	  person	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  insider	  dealing.’	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compelling the disclosure of information and allowing direct use of self-incriminating 
material, which seems to be the obvious remedies, the Court decided to strike down 
the penalty provision which by itself did not infringe any provision of the Bill of 
Rights.  The argument was that without this penalty clause, the proceedings would no 
longer be classified as “criminal” and therefore there would not be any violation of 
Article 10 of the Bill of Rights.  Sir Anthony Mason explained: 
 “Section 6(1) [of the Bill of Rights Ordinance] should be construed, in 
accordance with its terms, as conferring a power which will enable the courts to 
resolve the tension which exists between the legislative will and the protection 
given by the BOR by striking down only that part of the statute that causes the 
violation or breach, even if it does not itself infringe the BOR, when to do so 
best gives effect to the legislative intention….  Had it not been for the existence 
of the power [to impose a heavy penalty], the proceedings would not have 
acquired a substantially criminal character and there would have been no 
violation of the BOR.  The fact that the relationship or connection is indirect 
rather than direct is not a matter of any consequence….  The history of the 
matter demonstrates that the legislature would have preferred to sacrifice the 
power to impose a penalty and retain the other provisions in SIDO rather than 
lose the investigatory powers which have resulted in violations of the BOR… 
Whether the remedy is appropriate and just from the perspective of the 
respondents is a more difficult question.  The remedy is less satisfactory to them 
than the relief granted by the Court of Appeal because it preserves the findings 
made by the Tribunal and the orders for disqualification.”76 
  This is the first time that the Court fashions a remedy by striking down a 
provision which by itself does not infringe the Bill of Rights in order to bring the regime 
in line with the Bill of Rights.  While this is an innovative approach, two questions need 
further consideration.  Firstly, the right to a fair trial applies to both criminal and civil 
proceedings.  Therefore, the mere fact that the proceedings are no longer classified as 
criminal does not detract the protection of the right to a fair hearing, and direct use of 
self-incriminating material may still constitute a violation of the right to a fair hearing 
even when the consequences may not be as drastic as in criminal proceedings.  The 
Court has either not considered this question at all or implicitly assumes, somewhat 
prematurely, that there is no issue of fair hearing once the proceedings are no longer 
characterised as criminal.  Secondly, the suggestion that the legislature would prefer 
sacrificing a penalty clause than to lose the investigatory power may be a bold assertion.  
One of the problems of the previous regime is that it had no teeth.  Thus, a heavy penalty 
lies at the core of the new regime, without which the investigation may serve no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  At	  208-­‐210,	  paras	  113,	  117-­‐118.	  	  Section	  6(1)	  of	  the	  BOR	  provides	  that	  a	  court	  or	  tribunal	  may	  ‘grant	  such	  remedy	  or	  relief,	  or	  make	  such	  order,	  in	  respect	  of	  such	  a	  breach,	  violation	  or	  threatened	  violation	  as	  it	  has	  power	  to	  grant	  or	  make	  in	  those	  proceedings	  and	  as	  it	  considers	  appropriate	  and	  just	  in	  the	  circumstances.’	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deterrent purpose.  It is unclear what materials were before the court to enable it to make 
such a judgment.  Legislative history is not one-sided and it may be dangerous to rely on 
legislative history to predict what the legislature would do in light of the insidious 
activities of insider dealings now. 	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	   This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  two	  aspects	  of	  criminal	  law,	  and	  hence	  the	  conclusion	  cannot	  fairly	  represent	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  or	  the	  Basic	  Law	  on	  the	  development	  of	  criminal	  law	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  However,	  one	  issue	  stands	  out,	  namely	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  or	  any	  constitutional	  instrument	  will	  depend	  a	  lot	  on	  how	  it	  is	  approached	  and	  interpreted	  by	  the	  judiciary.	  	  Constitutional	  law	  is	  about	  values.	  	  The	  constitution	  sets	  out	  the	  primacy	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  applying	  those	  rights	  that	  the	  judiciary	  is	  put	  to	  the	  test.	  	  The	  outcome	  may	  depend	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  factors,	  including	  the	  predisposition	  of	  the	  judges	  as	  influenced	  by	  their	  previous	  training,	  experience,	  and	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  socio-­‐political	  environment.	  	  Judges	  in	  a	  common	  law	  system	  are	  generally	  not	  used	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  general	  constitutional	  provisions.	  	  In	  the	  interpretation	  of	  such	  general	  provisions,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  they	  resort	  to	  their	  common	  law	  training,	  and	  on	  some	  occasions,	  they	  approach	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  constitution	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  no	  different	  from	  the	  interpretation	  of	  any	  domestic	  legislation,	  focusing	  on	  what	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislature	  as	  revealed	  by	  a	  literal	  reading	  of	  the	  law	  rather	  than	  exploring	  the	  values	  underlying	  the	  constitutional	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  how	  best	  such	  rights	  could	  be	  protected	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  constitutional	  framework.	  	  Some	  judges	  even	  take	  the	  view	  that	  constitutional	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  at	  least	  insofar	  as	  procedural	  rights	  are	  concerned,	  are	  no	  more	  than	  a	  codification	  of	  the	  common	  law	  principles.	  In	  so	  doing,	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  the	  court	  would	  be	  more	  ready	  to	  give	  deference	  to	  the	  legislative	  will,	  as	  supremacy	  of	  the	  legislature	  has	  long	  been	  engrained	  in	  their	  common	  law	  learning.	  	  In	  the	  traditional	  common	  law	  system,	  judicial	  personality	  tends	  not	  to	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  any	  case.	  	  Yet	  individual	  predicament	  tends	  to	  have	  more	  profound	  impact	  in	  a	  constitutional	  regime	  where	  there	  is	  much	  more	  room	  for	  judicial	  creativity	  (or	  non-­‐creativity).	  	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  courts	  are	  not	  immune	  from	  wider	  socio-­‐political	  changes.	  	  In	  the	  days	  leading	  to	  and	  shortly	  after	  the	  changeover	  when	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  political	  uncertainty,	  the	  judiciary	  was	  conscious	  of	  establishing	  a	  liberal	  regime	  emphasizing	  the	  primacy	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  The	  court	  stands	  for	  independence,	  professionalism,	  and	  liberalism.	  	  It	  is	  the	  last	  fortress	  for	  the	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protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  liberties.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  before	  the	  changeover,	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  after	  the	  changeover,	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  paramount	  importance	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  at	  a	  particularly	  sensitive	  historical	  moment	  of	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  They	  are	  more	  ready	  to	  adopt	  a	  liberal	  approach	  and	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  underlying	  values	  in	  approaching	  constitutional	  interpretation.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  judiciary	  has	  no	  hesitation	  in	  exercising	  rigorous	  scrutiny	  over	  the	  Legislature,	  and	  its	  approach	  towards	  reverse	  onus	  provision	  is	  exemplary	  of	  any	  liberal	  regime.	  	  Reverse	  onus	  provisions	  represent	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  entrenched	  belief	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  of	  a	  criminal	  charge	  lies	  with	  the	  prosecution.	  	  The	  court	  will	  not	  lightly	  allow	  derogation	  from	  this	  principle,	  which	  could	  only	  be	  displaced	  by	  satisfying	  the	  tests	  of	  rationality	  and	  proportionality.	  	  	   Conscious	  of	  its	  role	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  anxious	  to	  build	  up	  a	  liberal	  tradition,	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  tends	  to	  deliver	  mostly	  unanimous	  decisions	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  after	  the	  changeover.	  	  However,	  as	  time	  passes,	  when	  the	  court	  has	  become	  more	  confident,	  the	  differences	  in	  judicial	  predicament	  become	  more	  apparent.	  	  	  The	  differences	  in	  approaching	  the	  balancing	  exercise	  are	  most	  illuminating	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Despite	  its	  repeated	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  right	  to	  be	  presumed	  innocent,	  it	  is	  disappointing	  that	  the	  court	  is	  reluctant	  to	  make	  a	  categorical	  finding	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  place	  a	  legal	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  defendant	  is	  unconstitutional	  in	  light	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  defendant	  being	  convicted	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  reasonable	  doubt.	  	  In	  Yeung	  Chung	  Ming,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  authority	  treating	  someone	  as	  guilty,	  and	  hence	  the	  presumption	  is	  violated,	  and	  the	  authority	  treating	  someone	  as	  possibly	  guilty,	  and	  hence	  the	  presumption	  is	  not	  violated,	  is	  bordering	  on	  a	  distinction	  without	  difference,	  	  	  	   Likewise,	  the	  way	  the	  courts	  deal	  with	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  is	  not	  encouraging	  either.	  	  This	  may	  be	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  numerous	  statutory	  inroads	  into	  such	  a	  right	  even	  under	  the	  common	  law	  system,	  so	  that	  judges	  are	  more	  ready	  to	  accept	  the	  propriety	  or	  constitutionality	  of	  such	  statutory	  restrictions.	  	  In	  Lee	  Ming	  Tee,	  it	  found	  that	  prohibition	  of	  direct	  use	  of	  self-­‐incriminating	  material	  did	  not	  prevent	  derivative	  use.	  	  In	  A	  v	  Commissioner	  
for	  the	  ICAC,	  the	  Court	  was	  prepared	  to	  uphold	  a	  restriction	  of	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  when	  there	  was	  no	  expressed	  provision	  to	  such	  effect,	  and	  the	  judicial	  safeguard	  lies	  in	  restricting	  the	  circumstances	  of	  permitting	  direct	  use	  of	  self-­‐incriminating	  materials.	  	  In	  Latkers,	  the	  court	  went	  further	  to	  uphold	  direct	  use	  of	  self-­‐incriminating	  materials,	  and	  applied	  the	  fair	  balance	  test	  in	  a	  way	  without	  giving	  any	  primacy	  to	  the	  fundamental	  right.	  	  In	  Koon	  Wing	  Yee,	  instead	  of	  striking	  down	  the	  infringing	  provision,	  the	  court	  struck	  down	  a	  different	  provision,	  which	  by	  itself	  did	  not	  infringe	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  so	  as	  to	  save	  the	  investigatory	  regime.	  	  One	  may	  legitimately	  ask	  what	  else	  is	  left	  with	  the	  right	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against	  self-­‐incrimination	  that	  is	  not	  already	  protected	  by	  the	  common	  law.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  difficult	  cases,	  but	  on	  a	  more	  general	  level,	  what	  is	  of	  concern	  is	  how	  the	  courts	  approach	  a	  constitutional	  right.	  	  Is	  it	  just	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  in	  the	  balancing	  equation	  which	  can	  readily	  be	  outweighed	  by	  other	  factors,	  or	  is	  it	  so	  fundamental	  that	  the	  State	  will	  have	  to	  tilt	  the	  balance	  with	  cogent	  and	  persuasive	  evidence	  after	  a	  rigorous	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  justifications?	  The	  fair	  balance	  approach	  adopted	  by	  Ma	  CJHC	  in	  Latkers	  and	  Riberio	  PJ	  in	  Lee	  Ming	  Tee	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  type	  of	  fair	  balance	  in	  the	  common	  law	  system	  that	  involves	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  weighing	  of	  conflicting	  factors	  with	  little	  discussion	  of	  why	  the	  right	  against	  incrimination	  is	  so	  valuable	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  	  The	  constitutional	  right	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  the	  balancing	  process.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Stock	  VP’s	  approach	  in	  Latkers	  and	  Bokhary	  PJ’s	  approach	  in	  
Yeung	  Chung	  Ming	  are	  what	  one	  would	  expect	  in	  a	  constitutional	  regime,	  giving	  primacy	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  	  	  	   Hong	  Kong	  is	  moving	  into	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  its	  constitutional	  era.	  	  With	  a	  number	  of	  senior	  judges	  at	  the	  highest	  courts	  having	  retired	  in	  the	  last	  two	  years	  or	  soon	  approaching	  retirement,	  and	  with	  a	  legal	  profession	  that	  is	  ready,	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  mount	  respectable	  constitutional	  challenges,	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  observe	  whether	  Hong	  Kong	  is	  writing	  a	  quiet	  epilogue	  or	  beginning	  another	  new	  and	  noble	  chapter	  in	  its	  constitutional	  development.	  	  	   	   	  	  	  
